Abstract-Within the literature on non-cooperative game theory, there have been a number of algorithms which will compute Nash equilibria. This paper shows that the family of algorithms known as Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) can be used to calculate Nash equilibria. MCMC is a type of Monte Carlo simulation that relies on Markov chains to ensure its regularity conditions. MCMC has been widely used throughout the statistics and optimization literature, where variants of this algorithm are known as simulated annealing. This paper shows that there is interesting connection between the trembles that underlie the functioning of this algorithm and the type of Nash refinement known as trembling hand perfection. This paper shows that it is possible to use simulated annealing to compute this refinement.
expectations and predictions ahout the play of the game.
A major limitation of the tracing procedure is that the logarithmic version of this method. does not always provide a path that traces to a perfect equilibrium. Harsanyi [6. p.691 . has argued that this problem can he resolved by eliminating all dominated pure strategies before applying the tracing procedure. However van Damme [ 18. p.771 constructs examples which do not rquire dominated pure strategies in which the tracing procedure yields a non-perfect equilibrium. Furthermore it was suggested by van Damme that the inconsistancy lies in the logarithmic control costs. Games which have a control cost parameter are of normal form so that players may also choose strategies, incur depending on how well they choose to control their actions.
Another limitation of the tracing procedure it relies on the algeobro-geometric properties of the equilibrium. This approach has been commonly used throughout the literature for computing the equilibrium of non-cooperative games. For example the focus of Lemke and Howson [9] for bimatrix games and the Wilson [201 and Scarf [ 141 algorithm for the N-person games has also been to utilise the fundamental geometry of games to calculate equilibrium. In general these approaches to Equilibrium calculation are computationally expensive.
However, within game theory there is a history of Monte Carlo methods heing applied to solve non-cooperative games. e.g. starting with Ulam [ 171 in 1954. From the view point of applying global optimization techniques to infinite games. Monte Carlo simulation has heen used by Georgobiani and Torondzadze as a means of providing Nash equilihria for rectangular games [3] . This is the approach that we will he developing in this paper. This paper is organised as follows. The second section of this paper introduces the MCMC algorithm and provides some discussion of its convergence properties in terms of Markov chain theory. As a starting point for this discussion the connection between MCMC sampling techniques and Monte Carlo sampling techniques is explored. The MCMC algorithms include the Gibbs sampler and the Metropolis algorithm and are often called simulated annealing. The third section of this paper will provide a characterization of these algorithms in terms of the trembling hand of trembling hand perfection. With this in mind, we provide an example of the use of simulated annealing applied to calculating Nash equilibrium. In this example the solution leads to equilibria that result from trembling hand perfection. 
A Review of Simulated Annealing
Monte Carlo simulation has been used extensively for solving complicated problems that defy an analytic formulation. The main idea hehind Monte Carlo simulation is to either construct a stochastic model that is in agreement with the actual prohlem analytically, or to simulate the problem directly. One problem with Monte Carlo methods is that if the underlying probability distribution is non-standard, then the convergence of sampled stochastic process cannot he assured hy the SLLN. One way around this is to realize that a stochastic process can he generated from any process that draws its samples from the support of underlying distrihution. Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) does this hy constructing a Markov chain that uses the underlying distribution as its stationary distribution. This enables the simulation of the stochastic process for non-standard distributions, while ensuring that the SLLN will hold.
As an illustration of the MCMC we will discuss the Metropolis algorithnr [IO] . In this algorithm, each iteration will comprise A updating steps. Let X,.: denote the state of S i at the end of the tth iteration. For step i of iteration t + 1; S i is updated using the Metropolis algorithm.
The candidate I; is generated from a proposal distribirriori pi ( E l X t , i 3 X t , -j ) , where denotes the value of proposal distribution has no impact on the decision criterion, and therefore will not impact on the convergence of this algorithm towards the stationary distribution ir (.).
To provide a fuller explanation, the transition kernel of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is given by P ( . Y t + l l W = q(Xt+1lXt)a (Xf,X,+l) 
This implies that ~( & ) P ( & + l I & )
= T ( ( X -t + l ) P ( X t l X t + l ) .
Integrating both sides of this equation, we get
This equation states that if X t is drawn from R. then so must &+I. In other words, once one sample value has been ohtained from the stationary distribution, then all subsequent samples must he drawn from the same distribution. This is only a partial justification of the Metropolis- . .
(3.7)
Equating qij = E;,g;j we can see that this condition can be rewritten as In this sub-section we provide an algorithm for computing a perfect equilibrium for a strategic game and show that this algorithm provides a sequence of perturbed mixed strategies that will eventually converge on perfection. The basic idea is to construct select a Markov chain and then use this Markov to deliver a Nash equilibrium via Markov chain approximation. The trick is to nominate the appropriate Markov chain'with the most suitable convergence properties to deliver convergence of the sequence completely mixed Nash equilibria of perturbed games or E-perfect equilibria to a perfect equilibrium. This is the objective that is undertaken in this section.
Consider an n-person game in strategic form ,,) in which N = {l, ...> n} is the player set. each player i E N has a finite set of pure strategies Si = {sil! ___, s i k i } and a pay-off function ui :
x jE,vS: + W mapping the set of pure strategy profiles
into the real number line.
In the strategic game G, for each player i E N there is a set of probability measures A; that can he defined over the pure strategy set Si: this is player i's mixed strategy set. The pay-off function for each player i E N will he defined as follows U; @i,p-;) = Cj:lpij~i (sij,p-i). A mixed strategy p E X ; E N & is Nash equilibrium of the strategic game G, if for all players i E N and all pi E A i
Suppose that as well there being a positive probability p i , of a player i selecting a pure strategy s i j E S;, there is a small probability & ; j that the pure strategy si, will he chosen by i out of error. In the case where player i selects his j t h pure strategy s i j by mistake, the probability of doing so is given by pi,. The total probability ofplayeri selecting a pure strategy s;j E Si is then given by p . .
It can he seen that in this case, the total probability of player i selecting a pure strategy si, t Si will he hounded
3=1
This leads to the definition of a perturbed game (G, q) as a finite strategic game derived from the strategic game G, in which each player i's mixed strategy set is the.set of completely mixed strategies for player i constrained by the probability of making an error (3.6) A mixed strategy combination p E x i E~A i (q,) is a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game ( G , q ) iff the following condition is satisfied
A mixed strategy p t X~~N A~ is a perfect equilibrium in the strategic game G if there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles {pk}El where limk+ppk = 'p, and for every player i E N and for every pi E Ai
In terms of our definition of a perturbed game, a mixed strategy is a perfect equilibrium iff there exist some sequences that 
. , p n ) = { p ; E a : ; U i ( S i j , P --i ) < U i ( S i f , p --i )
thenpij 5 E, Vsi;,sil E S j } (3.14)
If we then define. for each playeri E N, a mixed strategy
Then it can he seen that p; E F; (pl, ...,pa) will be nonempty. As,each Fi ( p l , ...,p,,) will a finite collection of linear inequalities, they will also be closed convex sets. In addition each Fi ( P I . ...,pn), by the continuity of the pay-off function U, ( s i j , .) , will also be upper semi-continuous. Proof For each player i E N , there will he a collection these subsets Nij = {Sif E s,; U, (Sij,P-i) < U i (s;l,p-i) a n d p c xiE,vAf} (3.17) of i's pure strategy space Si. The collection of these sets will referred to as player i's local neighborhood structure.
What we would like to do is for any two pure strategies siJ. sil E Si define a path from sij to sil such that In order to d o this, we observe that the point-set mapping defined by the set Fi(p1, -, p J = { P f EA:;Ua(S;j!P-i) < u , ( s , f , p -, ) thenpi, 5 E, Vsi;,sii E Si}. (3.19) is a collection homogenous transition probabilities Si Further more we can see that these transition prohahilities have the Markov property, i.e. given the path from si; to sit such that We define the following generating probability for the Markov chain for each player i E N if s;l E N;j otherwise, (3.23) where P ( S i j ) = l{Sif E s i ; U i ( S , j , P -i < u i ( s i f , P -i ) (3.24) a n d p E X,N~;.
We now introduce the following acceptance probability
where T is a control parameter. This last condition implies Given theses three conditions we can now see that the following will hold: e We know that under this acceptance criterion as k -i CO The transition probability matrix p t of the homogenous Markov chain generated by the game G will converge on a stationary distribution 7r ( T ) as k -+ 00. The transition probability matrix p: satisfies Myerson's definition of an E-perfect equilibria and as Myerson has shown, the fixed point that this sequence 0 converges on is also a perfect equilibrium.
and as T -+

An Application to Extensive Form Games
There are problems with viewing the existence of Nash equilibria as an end in itself. The most immediate problem with this has been the possible large number of Nash equilibria that can he found for any game, together with the likelihood that not all of these Nash equilibria will be reasonable in some sense. One way around this is to view the decision process of each agent participating in the game from a decision theoretic perspective. From this viewpoint, only those equilibria that can he found by backwards induction will he self-enforcing. This leads to a technique for strategy space reduction by iteratively removing strategies that lead to outcomes that are not strorigi? doniinated. As shown by Kuhn [X, Corollary I] , under the assumption of perfect information, this leads to a recursion that is equivalent to the Bellman equation of dynamic programming. An alternative to this is to construct a recursion that iteratively eliminates weak/? dominated strategies. However, the removal of weakly dominated strategies can lead to the elimination of strategy profiles that would otherwise provide suitable outcomes if only strongly dominated strategies were to have been removed. From the viewpoint of this paper these recursive strategy space reduction techniques can he considered to be an algorithm that reduces the size of a game, making equilibrium selection easier. However, these iterative reduction techniques becomes unwieldy once the assumption of perfect information is relaxed and information sets contain more than one node of the game tree.
This has led to a number of refinements to the definition of Nash equilibrium. Among the first of these was the notion of subganie perfection [IS] . which removes strategies that are not optimal for every subgame o f a extensive game's game tree. However, Selten [ 151 has shown that subgame perfection can also prescribe non-optimizing behaviour at information sets that are not reached when the equilibrium is played. This is because the expected payoff for the player whose information set is not reached will not depend on their own strategy. As a result every strategy will maximize their payoff. As van Damme [ 18, p. 8-91 states, that this can be removed if the equilibrium prescribes a choice, at each information set that is a singleton, that maximizes the expected payoff after the information set. The problem is that not all subgame perfect equilibria satisfying this criteria are sensible.
Another approach which was suggested by Selten [ 151, was to eliminate "unreasonable" subgame perfect equilibria by allowing the possibility of "mistakes" or "trembles" on the part of decision makers. In this way, isolated information sets are removed, as every information set can now be reached with positive probability. The other advantage of trembling hand perfection is that, unlike subgame perfection, it can be applied directly to the normal form of any game. Although, as van Damme shows, the perfect equilihria of a game's strategic and extensive forms need not coincide. An equivalence relationship holds for only the agent ilornialform and extensive form of any game 1151. This is because the agent normal form of any game views each node of the game tree, of the extensive form of the game, as a player in:the game. As a consequence each player represents an information set held by the player and will have an identical payoff function to the player.
As was shown by Selten [ 151. the perfect equilibria of a game's strategic and extensive forms need not coincide.
However he showed that an equivalence relationship holds between the equilibria of any extensive game and its associated agent normal form [ 151. This is because the agent normal form of any game views each node of the game tree, of the extensive form of the game, as a player in the game.
As a consequence each player represents an information set held by the player and will have an identical pay-off function to the player.
We let re define an extensive game consisting of a set of n players, a game tree K = (T: R) consisting of a set of nodes T and a binary relation R which is a partial ordering on the set of nodes. The nodes of the game tree are classified as either non-terminal or terminal according to whether or not their are succeeding nodes in the game tree. The partial ordering is used to define a path of successive nodes. The non-terminal nodes of the game tree are partitioned into the sets PO, P I , ..., P,, that specify the moves associated with each player, with PO being the partition associated with random moves that are not associated with any player. All of the non-terminal nodes is the information partition U = (Ul, ....> U,), where each set U, is a partition of P, into information sets, such that all nodes within an information set U E L', have the same number of immediate successors and path intersects an information set at most once. Under the assumption of perfect information each information set U E li, will be a singleton. This paper will assume imperfect information -this implies that if the information set U E U; contains a node x E P;. player i will not be able to distinguish other nodes contained in this information set based on information possessed when moving to x. Throughout this paper it will also he assumed that cornplete iitformation is present -i.e. each player has perfect recall and will remember everything from earlier in the game, including their own moves.
Associated with each random move is a probability distribution p: The payoffs associated with the set of terminal points Z of the game tree are denoted by the n-tuple r = ( T~, . : . , T , ) , where each player's payoff is a function of the terminal points T, ( z ) , I E Z. With the information partition U a choice set C = {C, : U E U$LIL'i} can be defined, where each C, is a partition of the union of sets of successors S (z) = {y; z E P (U)} for each z E U : UZE,S (x). The interpretation is that if player i takes the choice c E C, , at information set U E U; , then if i is at x E U , the next node reached is the element of S ( 5 ) contained in c. Under the assumption of imperfect information and perfect recall, a probability distribution bi is assigned on C, , to each information set U E U,. This distribution b, is a behavioural strategy. with the set of all these strategies for player i defined by Bi. The profile of all players behavioural strategies is denoted by b E B := x : =~B~, where B is the set of all behavioural strategy combinations. The probability of a particular realization of the game re is denoted by pb (I).
The definition of perfect equilibrium we will use is based Selten [I51 and Friedman [2] . Kuhn [SI has shown that these behavioural and mixed strategies are realization equivalent.
Therefore, for an extensive form game re we let r = (S, R ) define its strategic form representation. with S denoting the set of all mixed strategy profiles. The payoff profile R is an n-tuple. where the ith element is defined as
*EZ
A perturbed game of r is defined by (r,q) , where q is a mapping that assigns to every choice in r a positive number We apply it to the following example taken from Friedman [ 2 . p. 511. This example is based on the three player extensive form game used by Selten [ 151 to illustrate the existence of perfect equilibrium. The game tree is defined as follows in Figure 4 where the ai are the mixed strategies and are errors defined for i = l: 2,3. Letting the errors approach zero, it can be seen that perfect equilibrium is defined by (l? 1> 0).
The results of the simulation are shown helow in Figure  4 .2 and indicate convergence to the trembling hand perfect eauilibrium.
Conclusion
This paper has concentrated on some of the underlying theoretical mechanics of simulated annealing and how they relate to the trembling hand perfect refinement of Nash equilibrium. It has been argued that the trembles that underlie 
